There are, however, two notable aspects of the negotiations that are controversial. The first aspect relates to the prospect of other APEC members joining later and especially China not participating in TPP negotiations generally and in investment negotiations in particular.3 Linked to this are the implications arising from China's conceivable leadership of a potentially rival regional agreement referred to as ASEAN + 3 (China, Korea and Japan), or less probably, ASEAN + 6 (China, Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India). 4 The prospect of an ASEAN + 3 Agreement has become more likely to eventuate, possibly following the recent regional agreement concluded between China, Korea and Japan which is awaiting domestic ratification.5 A related concern is that, while these regional agreements will liberalize investment among their member states, they will have the opposite impact on non-member states. In particular is the concern that China may follow the direction of the Supreme People's Court which some commentators perceive, correctly or otherwise, as protectionist. 6 The second aspect relates to Australia's participation in the negotiations on the Investment Chapter, with its position being that it will not agree to investor-state arbitration ('ISA') to resolve investment disputes. A draft version of the TPP Investment Chapter was posted on June 12, 2012 on the website of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.7 This paper examines that draft Investment Chapter and analyses provisions bearing on the resolution of investor-state disputes arising under the TPPA. It also briefly examines the significance of Australia's insistence on an exemption from ISA, and what this means in terms of the institutional differences between ISA and the use of domestic courts to resolve investment disputes.
Sources of an Investment Chapter
The draft version of the Investment Chapter of the TPPA leaked to the public in June 2012,8 while undoubtedly authentic, is unlikely to constitute a final version of the investment chapter. This is especially so in light of the need for public consultation and the need to secure agreement from some states that are apparently pushing for amendments to the Chapter. Given the political nature of TPP negotiations, it is difficult to predict the precise form of ISA provisions that the TPP negotiators will finally adopt. Nor is it self-evident whether they will adopt a uniform template or model ISA provisions, with variations on a country-by-country basis, or leave it to TPPA signatories to provide for investor-state disputes bilaterally. Having said that, it is most likely that the TPPA will provide expressly for ISA. It is already the dominant method of redressing investor-state disputes; and the United States Trade Representative favours it strongly over the alternatives. 9 It is likely that the model of the evolving investment chapter will extend beyond the draft. Given the US's dominance in negotiations, other source models will include, to varying degrees, recent BITs to which the US is a party and the 2012 US Model BIT.10 An influential BIT source is likely to be the investment chapter in KORUS which came into force on 15 May 2012.11 Other Congress, Oct. 12, 2011) recent US trade and investment agreements with Asian and Latin American countries, such as the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement, are also likely to influence the negotiating and drafting process.12 However, all these BITs are limited as sources for the TPP by their bilateral character. A multilateral TPP investment chapter, whether negotiated on a country-by-country basis or not, must accommodate the diverse interests of a plurality of state Parties. Some of these accommodations are achievable through country specific annexes that leave the substance of the TPPA intact. However, the greater the number of country-specific exemptions or qualifications, the less influential the TPPA is likely to be as an umbrella agreement. 13 The rest of this paper analyses the provisions in the draft Chapter and recommends changes, where appropriate. Many of the provisions in the draft Chapter are included between square brackets, likely for the purpose of future negotiation or country-specific exemptions. There are also asterisk references to annexes including such exemptions. It is also likely that a number of provisions in the draft are likely to be criticized by the negotiators as well as the public. The scope of an "investment" in the draft is particularly wide. The negotiators may need to negotiate further limits on the regulatory authority of state Parties. They may also need to limit the liberal standards of protection that are accorded to investors from home Party states investing in host Party states.14 These factors are likely to constrain the ambit of operation and application of the draft.
Key Definitions
This part considers the key definitions relating to the nature of an investor, a covered investment and the nature of an expropriation.
2.1
Who is an Investor? Parties to TPP negotiations are likely to seek clarification as to the nature of an "investor" and an "investment". First, it is likely that they will want to impose restrictions on foreign investors bringing ISA claims against host states, such Such a pre-establishment formula in which investor protection is extended to a pre-establishment period is likely to be controversial on grounds that it grants foreign investors overbroad protection and that it interferes unduly with the sovereign rights of states. However, such a pre-establishment formula is common in US BITs and for that reason, may prevail in the TPPA. The bracketed provisions in the pre-establishment formula above are also likely to be controversial in part because of actual or potential tension among negotiating Parties over who can bring an ISA claim against a host state Party. If the draft definition of an "investor" prevails, it is likely that country specific exemptions may limit its scope of application, notably to contain adventitious investors from lodging claims against a TPP state Party. This problem could arise from the potentially overbroad provision in the draft chapter treating a Party "that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of another Party" as an investor. In particular, concern will arise over investors whose investments are historical, and over the open-endedness of an "attempt to make an investment". Investor forum shopping is already an issue in international investment law. Overly ready access to a jurisdiction may exacerbate that process.
An offsetting response is that investors will mount ISA claims selectively against TPPA host states even if the TPPA adopts a narrow definition of "investor". This empowerment of investors is potentially overstated insofar as different state Parties to the TPPA are likely to seek exemptions for certain kinds of investors and investments through country specific annexes. If such exclusions eventuate, foreign investors may still forum shop taking account of such country-specific exemptions and seeking the seemingly most vulnerable forum in which to make a claim. However, such investor strategies are widely practiced already and are by no means peculiar to the TPPA.
Also potentially controversial is the absence of a detailed definition of "effective nationality" in the bracketed passage above. The TPP negotiators may intend to negotiate such a definition, or alternatively, to avoid defining it.
2.2
What is an Investment? A particular challenge is in defining an investment. Although wide definitions of investment are common in more recent BITs, it is arguable that such a definition should be neither over-nor under-inclusive. That challenge is complicated by different conceptions of an investment in different conventions, treaties and arbitration rules. For example, Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention does not define an investment. However, the ICSID did not intend to abrogate responsibility to define an investment to ISA tribunals to define on a case-by-case basis. The purpose of the ICSID drafters was rather to favor a broad definition of investment, while deferring to State parties to opt out of such provisions as a measure of state autonomy. The related purpose was to provide ICSID signatories with the flexibility to modify investment policies over time, including in relation to the definition of an investment, not to conceive of investment narrowly a priori. 16 Other frameworks, such as the UNCITRAL Rules, the approach, seeks to unify the first two approaches into a viable alternative by including both objectively restricted and non-restrictive requirements. The approach focuses primarily on contribution, risk and duration, but excludes "the contribution to the economic development of the host state", significantly because the ICSID does not include economic development as a criterion in determining an investment.25 Given these observations, it is appropriate to determine which approach the TPPA is likely to adopt. The TPPA is likely to define "investment" expansively and flexibly, as well as to include an illustrative list of kinds of property that can constitute an investment, consistent with the purposes of the ICSID.26 However, it is also likely that TPPA negotiators will be sensitive to concerns among state Parties to restrict the scope of an "investment" in response to national interests, including the stages of economic development of state Parties, not unlike restrictions on an "investor."27 The definition of an investment is also likely to be subject to specified criteria that aim to avoid a floodgate of ISA claims against developing states in particular. The tension between a liberal and a stricter cumulative approach towards an investment is likely to be redressed in part through country specific exclusions of particular kinds of investments and by tailoring down the breadth of an "investment" in the current draft.
At present the draft definition of an investment is broad. Article 12.2 includes as an actionable investment: "every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk." 25 See Gaillard, supra note 16, stating that "this approach is the most faithful both to the text and the intention of the drafters of the ICSID Convention". 26
The KORUS FTA, supra note 11, art. 11.28 defines the types of investments that are protected broadly as "every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk," and includes a series of examples. In addition, KORUS protects not only the investors of the home country, but also a business entity that is incorporated in the host State whose shareholders or members are nationals of the home country. The breadth of an "investment" is also evident in the plethora of categories of investment. It includes "an enterprise" which has potentially expansive meaning. It incorporates speculative investments, such as "futures, options and other derivatives" which may give rise to concerns that inbound investors will invoke them too readily and that host states may have difficulty regulating them effectively. In contrast, these kinds of investments may survive because they are not selectively used and some state Parties may assume, correctly or otherwise, that they have limited application in relation to those state Parties.
The draft also provides a wide range of intellectual property protections to investors, in respect of which country specific exemptions may be insufficient to redress this concern. Concessions to the expansive list of intellectual property rights of investors may be limited across-the-board or more likely, by piecemeal country-specific exemptions. A common denominator concern will be that the US provides far more extensive intellectual property protections than most other TPP negotiating parties, which will be a reason to attempt to reframe the provision to accommodate non-US investor interests. Finally, debate may arise over limits imposed upon states due to the expansive protection accorded to "tangible or intangible . . . property".28
A noteworthy observation, highlighting these concerns is the extent of square bracketed information included in the definition of an "investment". If the bracketed information is intended to scope the extent of issues still to be resolved by TPP negotiators, some hard-bargaining lies ahead. 
2.3
What is an Expropriation? A particularly telling issue for TPP negotiators is in determining what constitutes a legitimate "government taking". How to define an expropriation, narrowly or broadly, is a long-standing question; and resolution is still controversial.29
The TPPA will probably, but not assuredly, include criteria that delineate when an expropriation is permitted. That determination will reflect compromise over the permissible boundaries of an indirect expropriation or other government taking.30 The TPPA will also provide signatory countries with exemptions from such provisions in light of local requirements and on grounds of essential national security and related national interest grounds. These exceptions will probably include specific public interest exemptions, such as to protect the environment, promote sustainable development and preserve domestic labour markets.31
The draft Investment Chapter confirms that an expropriation occurs when a state Party "interferes with a tangible or intangible or property interest in an investment."32 The reference to a "tangible or intangible interest in an investment" is wide-ranging. An "interest" is wider than a "property right"; and intangible property is potentially expansive as well. The draft also states that "an expropriation may be either direct or indirect." A direct expropriation occurs when a state takes an investor's property outright, including by "nationalization, compulsion of law or seizure."33 This is unexceptional, although 29 See also G. C. differences can arise, inter alia, as to the legitimacy of such actions, not only under law, but according to due process requirements of "the principal legal systems of the world" identified in Article 12.6.2(a).34
The draft recognizes that an indirect expropriation "requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry".35 However, the nature and scope of an indirect expropriation is more difficult to determine a priori than a direct expropriation, while tribunals can give it an overbroad or unduly narrow scope of application. A difficult issue is to determine when an indirect expropriation has occurred, including its key components and the gravity of its effects. It is in these respects that the draft is most challenging.
Annex 12-D 2(b) draws a parallel between a direct and an indirect expropriation, stressing that an indirect expropriation constitutes the taking of property "in a manner equivalent to direct expropriation, in that it deprives the investor in substance of the use of the investor's property, although the means used fall short of those specified [with respect to a direct expropriation]". This is a plausible distinction, although by itself, it does not provide indicators by which to recognize the nature and effect of an indirect expropriation. However, Annex 12-C. 4(a) elaborates by considering "among other factors (i) the economic impact of the government action, although . . . an adverse effect, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action."
In addition, Annex 12-D.3 addresses the severity of an indirect expropriation by providing that the deprivation arising from the state's action ". . . must be (a) either severe or for an indefinite period; or (b) disproportionate to the public purpose." These tests, arguably, are as coherent as they reasonably can be, subject to the realization that the nature and impact of an indirect expropriation that differs from case to case inevitably gives rise to different conceptions relating to the reasonableness of state action, including the justification for the means used, and its effect upon a particular investor or class of investors. In implicitly recognizing this difficulty, the draft attempts to provide a probabilistic response to an indirect expropriation, namely, in relation to the deprivation of property that is discriminatory in nature and effect.
Annex 12-D.4 maintains that "[a] deprivation of property shall be particularly likely to constitute indirect expropriation where it is either: (a) discriminatory in its effect, either as against the particular investor or against a class 34 Discussed below in Section VII (iv) Compensation. 35
Annex 12-C.4.
of which the investor forms part; or (b) in breach of the state's prior binding written commitment to the investor, whether by contract, license or other legal document." This qualification is understandable but also limited. In particular, it does not deal with a government taking that, while not discriminatory, nevertheless has an adverse effect upon an investor of a state Party. The fact that the host state expropriates from both its own subjects and foreign investors based on a questionable public interest, does not legitimate the indirect expropriation of property from the inbound investor. The "national treatment" standard was not so intended.
The draft attempts to deal with this issue in two seemingly competing versions of Annex 12-D-5. In one version it states that: "Except in rare circumstances in which paragraph [12-D.]4 applies, such measures taken in the exercise of a state's regulatory powers as may be reasonably justified in the protection of the public welfare, including public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an indirect expropriation.] In the other version of 12-D-5, it states: "Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designated and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, and the environment do not constitute indirect expropriation]." The first version of 12-D-5 focuses on whether the government's action is "reasonably justified". The second version concentrates on its intention, in designing and applying the expropriation to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives. However, both provide potentially wide scope for Party states to confiscate, nationalize or otherwise take or seize property on wide grounds of "public health, safety and the environment".
The key issue, overall, is not that the Annexes provide governments with wider powers to expropriate, which they do. The key issue lies in the divergent capacity of states to demonstrate the legitimacy or reasonableness of their actions.
Evidently, final agreement has not been reached as to how to conceptualise indirect expropriation in a manner that allows governments to exercise their discretion in areas such as protecting the environment. Reference may be made to the 2012 US Model BIT, art 4 of which emphasizes that expropriation and compensation are "intended to reflect customary international law" and that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations."36 Annex B para. 2 provides that "An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or property interest in an investment."37 Further, in the absence of a level playing field, states at different levels of development may face different levels of difficulty in justifying their actions. They may lack the economic or sociological data to demonstrate the nature of the economic, social or environmental threat, such as the full impact of a foreign investment upon public health or sustainable development. Such studies as they may present in arbitration may also be subject to intense scrutiny by experts employed by foreign investors to challenge government studies on grounds that they are unreliable or otherwise deficient.
There is no perfect solution to these dilemmas. One plausible option is to provide country-specific exemptions. For example, the draft does specify in Annex 12-E that, "notwithstanding the obligations under Article 12.12 (expropriation and compensation), where Brunei, Malaysia or Singapore is the expropriating Party, any measure of expropriation relating to land shall be for a purpose and upon payment of compensation in accordance with the applicable domestic legislation of the expropriating Party.]"38
Another option is for the draft to make reference to further criteria in considering the nature of an expropriation, namely, by taking account of the level of development of the state Party, including its particular development needs and capacity to address them through direct and indirect acts of expropriation, consistent with the strict test of "investment" adopted in the Salini case.39
A further option is to devise across-the-board exemptions on issues about which the state Parties can agree. For example, Article XX.3 on Measures to Safeguard the Balance of Payments provides: "Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining temporary safeguard measures with regard to transfers or payments for current account transactions if there is serious balance of payments or external financial difficulties [ authorization to adopt temporary safeguard measures; they must be able to establish the fact, or "threat of serious balance of payments or external financial difficulties" to justify such action.
2.4
Compensation What makes the alternative constructions of an "expropriation" difficult are the draft provisions for compensation. Article 12.12 provides for "Expropriation and Compensation" thus:
No party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization, except a. For a public purpose; b. In a non-discriminatory manner; c. On payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and d. In accordance with due process of law. 2. Compensation shall a. Be paid without delay; b. Be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place; c. Not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier; and d. Be fully realizable and freely transferable.
The key problem with Article 12.12 is in sub-section 1 (c) and (d) and 2 (a). Not only is "adequate and effective compensation" difficult to explicate, it is virtually certain to constitute "full" compensation, namely, being "equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place". It is onerous for emerging and developed state Parties to comply with due process requirements which, as elsewhere in the draft chapter, may comport well with some of the principal legal systems of the world, but certainly not all. The result is that for some emerging and developing state Parties, the choice will be either not to expropriate at all, regardless of whether it causes significant public harm domestically, or to do so at their economic and political peril. If they cannot satisfy the draft requirements that are ancillary to an expropriation, however extensive their rights to expropriate may otherwise be, they will be captive to well financed foreign investors who may resist expropriation, or failing that, claim lost profits that the affected state simply cannot afford. Avoiding expropriation, or capitulating, to foreign investors may be the emerging or developing state Party's most realistic option.
Standards of Treatment
This part focuses on the different standards of treatment accorded to foreign investors in international investment law, in particular, national treatment, most-favoured nation treatment, and fair and equitable treatment. It considers these standards, first, in customary international and treaty law and second, in relation to the TPP process.
3.1
National Treatment Standards of protection accorded to foreign investors are likely to include national treatment by which foreign investors receive comparable treatment to domestic investors, and most favored nation treatment by which the host State is required to grant to nationals of the other party treatment not less favorable than it grants to investors of other countries.40 However, the boundaries of such national and most favored nation treatment may be contentious. Qualifications to such treatment may also be included in the country annexes.41
Article 12.4.1 of the draft Investment Chapter provides for "National Treatment": "Each party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory." There is nothing exceptional about such treatment, although the exceptions and qualifications discussed in the sections below are crucial in determining the substantive nature and scope of a "national treatment" standard under a TPPA.
3.2
Most Favoured Nation Treatment Article 12.5 deals with Most-Favoured Nation Treatment: It is notable that China accords national treatment to foreign investors in its Model BIT, but often does not include that standard in its BITs. One response is that it is resistant to the national treatment of foreign investors in practice. A completely different response is that it extends more than national treatment to many foreign investors.
2. Most Favoured Nation Treatment in respect of covered investments as well.
This provision is also unremarkable. As in the case of national treatment, its substantive scope is best considered in light of exemptions to, or qualifications in its application such as under a TPPA.
3.3
Fair and Equitable Treatment The TPPA will likely provide for the fair and equitable treatment of a foreign investor in the event of an expropriation. This standard is particularly important, as it works closely with provisions on expropriation that will be embodied in a TPPA, as in other investment treaties.
The language used to define or describe fair and equitable treatment can vary from treaty to treaty, as well as in customary international investment law. As a result, compliance with fair and equitable treatment as a condition of lawful expropriation may lead to concerns among developing states that they will be subject to significant compensation claims brought by foreign investors from developing countries. 42 Related to the question of the quantum of compensation is whether TPP negotiators would be willing to create country-specific exemptions to acknowledge that some states lack the resources to compensate foreign investors "fully".43 42 The problem in defining "fair and equitable" in the treatment of foreign investors is not peculiar to the TPP negotiations. Article 5 of the 2012 US Model BIT provides, "Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." The section explains that "the concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights." This appears to limit the ability of investors to rely on "fair and equitable treatment" and indirect expropriation claims, and enables host governments to defend non-discriminatory actions taken to protect the environment and public health.
The draft investment chapter of the TPPA engages this debate, but should not be expected to resolve it. Article 12.6.1 provides for the "Minimum Standard of Treatment", in "accordance with customary international law" including "fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."48 Article 12.6.2 elucidates that the concept of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required . . ." by the "[minimum] standard of treatment of aliens as the [minimum] [general] standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments". Article 12.6.2 then adds: a. "Fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; and b. "full protection and security" requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required under customary international law.
Whether these definitions of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" will survive into later drafts is uncertain. However, in grounding fair and equitable treatment in the "minimum" or "general" standards of treatment under customary international law, the draft articles have affirmed pre-existing customary international law, presumably including the defences that states can invoke to deny that they have violated that standard. This observation is somewhat affirmed by the stipulation that states are not required to accord foreign investors of TPPA state Parties with treatment "in addition to or http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/pope. aspx?lang=en (last visited June 19, 2012). 48
Annex 12-B defines "Customary International Law" as the Parties "shared understandings" in regard to the standards of treatment identified in the draft Chapter.
beyond that minimum standard". In effect, these provisions lower the threshold that both developed and developing states are required to meet to demonstrate that they are not acting unfairly or inequitably towards investors of another state Party. However, this inference of an expansive "fair and equitable" treatment standard accorded to foreign investors is somewhat offset by the provision that such treatment accords with the principle of due process embodied "in the principal legal systems of the world." Establishing "the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world" is challenging in two key respects. First, it is unclear which systems "the principal legal systems of the world" include. If they include common and civil law systems, they refer primarily to substantive systems of law, as distinct from their procedural application which varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The fact that the legal systems of both China and Japan are grounded in the German Civil Code relates primarily to their adoption of German private law, rather than German public law which includes principles of due process and rules of natural justice. Second, even disregarding this distinction between private and public law, it is difficult to determine coherently the content of due process "in the principal legal systems of the world", unless the intention is to inculcate an international standard of due process, such as enunciated by the International Court of Justice.49 If this is so, it is questionable why the draft does not so state more explicitly, other than through its broad reliance on customary international law. Identifying what is "unfair" or "inequitable" for foreign investors according to comparative, as distinct from an international standard of due process is illusive at best, and potentially difficult for some developed and developing states alike to satisfy.
The ultimate limitation in the draft article, however, is the adoption of a standard of due process that is undoubtedly somewhat higher than the standard of many countries whose courts do not apply due process as it is conceived in the legal systems of many developed countries. The further problem is that, in addition to the difficulties some developing state Parties will have in satisfying this standard, a not insignificant number of developing states will also fail to satisfy this standard. For some, a summary expropriation of an investment without prior notice to a foreign investor is deemed necessary in the national interest. For others, that expropriation will offend the dictates of natural justice. 49 See e.g. John P. Gaffney, "Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System," Am. Univ. L. Rev. 14 (1999): 1174.
Nor will creating country-specific exemptions or qualifications necessarily have significant political mileage, given that few developing states would openly acknowledge that their standards of due process fall short of internationally mandated norms. Developed state Parties would also not want their legal systems challenged for violating due process, as critics have identified arose from the Loewen case in the United States.50
A possible way out of this impasse is for a revised draft to subscribe to the principal legal systems of the world, while also taking account of the different stages of legal development of state Parties to the TPPA, including in regard to due process of law.
A final observation is the correlation which the draft draws between fair and equitable treatment and "Minimum Standard of Treatment", in "accordance with customary international law". The problem with a minimal standard of treatment under customary international law relates, less to attempts to define it, than to apply it in particular cases. For example, in the NAFTA case of Pope and Talbot v. Canada, even though the UNCITRAL tribunal concluded that it was not limited under NAFTA Article 1105 to the "international minimum standard of treatment," Canada nevertheless won the case.51 However, minimal standards of treatment are applied to a variety of specific defenses, notably under the US and Canadian Model Investment Treaties.52 Negotiating parties will diverge over the boundaries of this standard, particularly given that the threshold for this standard is ordinarily quite low. However, if US practice prevails, a single minimum standard will be delineated in the TPPA itself.53 The likely result will be that TPP negotiators will rely on 50 See ISA tribunals to delineate the standard over time, instead of trying to do so expressly ab initio by treaty.
Modelling Dispute Management under the TPPA
This section considers three broad methods of dispute management applicable to the TPPA. The first is state-to-state dispute management of investor-state disputes, notably through the diplomatic assistance which TPPA home states provide to outbound investors in other TPPA countries. The second is the prevention and avoidance of conflict through negotiation, and the resolution of conflict through third party facilitation, such as conciliation or mediation. The third is the appointment of third parties to resolve investor-state disputes, in particular by resort to arbitration. Particular attention is given to the different kinds of arbitration, notably international commercial arbitration and investor-state arbitration. Three challenges evolve out of this analysis for consideration in subsequent sections. The first is to challenge the presupposition that ISA is incompatible with the other methods of dispute prevention, avoidance and resolution identified above. The second is to challenge the proposition that resort to domestic courts, is determinative as a method of resolving investor-state disputes. The third is to evaluate how different dispute management options-dispute prevention, avoidance and resolution-operate in the intense political context of TPPA negotiations and their sequel. These three challenges are evaluated below in light of Section B: Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in the draft TPPA.
4.1
Diplomatic Protection It is unlikely that the signatories to the TPPA will agree to formal state-to-state diplomatic intervention beyond facilitative and non-binding representations.54 Their shared concern will be to avoid a potential floodgate of requests for diplomatic intervention from investors from home states; and to avoid alienating TPPA partner host states. As a result, the TPPA investment chapter is unlikely to provide for express diplomatic measures pursuant to which investors can rely on home and host states to resolve investor-state disputes. However, the TPPA is likely to provide for state-to-state negotiations in the event of a dispute between states; and such a dispute could conceivably encompass investorstate disputes. The approach adopted in the draft investment chapter reflects this approach, at least in part. The draft denies diplomatic protection to investors in host states that are parties to the TPPA once ISA proceedings have been instituted. Instead, it permits states to engage in "informal diplomatic exchanges". However, the prohibition is not hermetically sealed. For example, a home state presumably can intervene to protect its own interests if it can render them distinct from the interests of its outbound investors. The draft, arguably, also permits home state to intervene on the potentially broad ground that a host state party to the TPPA "has failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such a [ISA] dispute."56 If this provision survives, influential states may try to supervise, if not police, the enforcement of awards in favour of their significant outbound investors. Whether the wording of the draft will be changed to accommodate this sensitivity remains to be seen. litigation.58 None of this provides any clarity as to how and in particular, how long investor-state parties are expected to consult and negotiate in particular cases.59 Requiring such negotiations or consultations under the TPPA could both protract and increase the costs of conflict, added to the delay and costs of ensuing arbitration or litigation. Negotiations and consultation may also reinforce the power of wealthy investors or dominant states who invoke it, not to resolve a dispute in good faith, but to force the other party into submission under the threat of protracted ISA. At the same time, investor-state disputes are often settled through negotiation, or by mediation, before or during arbitration, as is evidenced on the ICSID website.60 Negotiation and conciliation are invariably options available to states and investors, regardless of whether they are provided for by TPPA treaty or contract. In addition, such measures do not preclude parties from resorting to either arbitration or litigation should negotiation or conciliation fail. Bilateral investment agreements and investor-state contracts which provide for, or even mandate conflict avoidance options, invite lip-service to such options as much as the serious pursuit of them by one or both parties to them. Going through the motions of conflict avoidance, intent on arbitrating or litigating is ultimately costly and dilatory for at least one party to such machinations.
Consultations and Negotiations
Nevertheless, the institutional adoption of dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms is a way in which investor-state parties can ameliorate their differences before they grow into conflicts. Should states endorse dispute avoidance measures under the TPPA, as the UNCTAD proposes, it could lead to the wider endorsement of dispute avoidance options and it could promote innovation in reconciling differences between states and foreign investors. Such adoption could redress the effect of high cost and often complex ISA proceedings and it could also encourage local, regional, and global institutions to adopt innovative processes to prevent or avoid disputes. In particular, states could be relied on to incorporate negotiation or conciliation into their post-TPPA BITs as requirements prior to investors initiating arbitration or litigation proceedings. Furthermore, states could also construct restrictive dispute resolution clauses in those BITs, including by requiring mandatory mediation.61 Interestingly, the draft TPPA chapter does not mandate conciliation or mediation proceedings. Again, mandatory mediation might concern developing countries that well financed investors could protract mediation proceedings while concurrently continuing their disputed investment practices in the host country. If mandatory mediation is adopted by the TPPA, it should prescribe reasonable timelines and good faith requirements, to limit these risks to both state parties and investors.62 While it is ordinarily preferable to avoid investor-state conflicts rather than resort to litigation or arbitration, there is no assurance that negotiation, conciliation, mediation, or some other variant of managed conflict prevention will avoid or resolve conflicts in investment disputes with states.63 Indeed, a systemic problem is that investment disputes often arise between arms-length as distinct from informal investor-state relationships. Specifically, investors interact impersonally with government bureaucracies, and informal methods of dispute avoidance often are ill suited to resolving disputes that are levered up to legal departments within those bureaucracies. This absence of a pre-existing culture of cooperation between states and foreign investors, especially when investors are ill attuned to cultural dynamics within the forum, makes dispute avoidance measures harder to implement.64
At their best, these dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms may discourage parties from resorting to fractious, costly, and disruptive arbitration or litigation. At their worst, however, they may protract investor-state conflict, delay dispute resolution, and increase its costs. Institutionalized dispute resolution options that are incorporated into bilateral investment treaties may avert litigation or arbitration, or they may simply delay it. Conciliation may fail because one party objects to the appointment of a facilitator; or, on appointment, that facilitator may fail to secure investor-state cooperation in managing a conflict, such as by a party declining to allow consultation with non-governmental agencies.
4.3
Submitting a Claim to Arbitration The TPPA is virtually certain to provide expressly for ISA, including conceivably detailed ISA provisions, stipulations for the choice of institutions before which to bring ISA claims, and the terms and conditions governing ISA. 65 It is noteworthy, too, that comparatively recent amendments to arbitration rules, notably, the UNCITRAL Rules 2010 were influenced somewhat by the perceived needs of investor-state arbitration.70 Certainly, in the past concerns have been raised with respect to the viability of ISA as an efficient method of dispute resolution. A functional challenge to institutional ISA, such as under the ICSID, is the cost arising from the often complex nature of proceedings.71 ISA proceedings are also perceived to be dilatory, difficult to manage, disruptive, unpredictable, and not subject to appeal.72 Coupled with these challenges is the observation that low-income TPP parties may lack the resources to bear the legal fees and related costs of defending claims from well-resourced transnational investors.73 Moreover, these countries also lack the econometric data to verify the adverse impact of foreign investment upon their local economies, such as upon the environment.74
Nor Nor are the metrics used to measure the performance costs of investment arbitration reliable in predicting costs and time in prospective cases. This is due, in part, to unanticipated costs, such as disruption costs and delays arising from a challenge to an arbitrator, the absence or illness of a party or arbitrator, managing third party interventions, and enforcing an award.76 These costs and delays arise in dispute resolution in general. However, they are accentuated in ISA disputes in which the economic stakes are often high, national sensitivities are in issue and damage to the reputation of states and sometimes investors exceeds the already high costs of the dispute.77 Public interest interveners sometimes can help to clarify at least some social costs of adverse ISA determinations, usually to the host state. However, these groups can do so only if they are privy to cost data, only if they can afford to petition to be heard, only if their petitions are granted, and only if their evidence is credible and material. 78 Even the proposition that developing states are comparatively disadvantaged on average to foreign investors is subject to some dispute. Given that developing states are more often subject to ISA claims than developed states, the statistics do not suggest that foreign investors overwhelmingly prevail in ISA disputes. Recent Facility decisions have favoured foreign investors.79 However, more information would be required to make a more informed assessment based on specific factors contributing to the success or failure of investor claims in general. In addition, the draft Investment Chapter, similarly to the 2012 US Model BIT, reflects concerns that frivolous claims could be pursued to supplement the final judgment on the merits where the tribunal failed to address challenges to jurisdiction in preliminary proceedings. As a result, the TPP appears to have sought to distinguish such preliminary issues from the merits.
Article 28 of the 2012 US Model BIT provides: "Without prejudice to a tribunal's authority to address other objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be made under Article 34 [Awards] .80 Arguably, the TPP Investment Chapter will adopt this language in its final version.
Finally, draft article 12.18.3 (d) also allows the claimant and respondent to agree to resolve their dispute under 'any other arbitration institution . . ., or under any other arbitration rules.' Generally speaking, the key perceived strengths and weaknesses of ISA are endemic to international commercial arbitration as well. On the one hand, international commercial arbitration is depicted as a sophisticated, commercial focused, private, expert, expeditious and cost effective method of resolving investment disputes. On the other hand, it is conceived as costly and dilatory, not least of all due to counsel and arbitrator fees, the location of commercial arbitration centres in expensive cities, and the costs of securing expert evidence and of arbitrators conducting site visits to gather evidence and hear testimony. 81 What neither ISA nor international commercial arbitration can be are replicas of common law litigation. It is unrealistic to expect arbitrators to adhere to a system resembling judicial precedent.82 Judicial precedent is a common law 79 See One also cannot expect arbitrators to develop a uniform body of international treaty law out of a plethora of differently worded investment treaties. 84 Further undermining the prospects of arbitrators reaching uniform investment awards is the realization that international investment law focuses on the expropriation of property, while the law of property varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.85 Not only are investment arbitrators called upon to interpret complex property concepts, they also must reach decisions based on divergent conceptions of property in otherwise similar cases.86 Further undermining the prospects of investment arbitrators reaching uniform awards is the realization that international investment law focuses on the expropriation of property. Not only does the law of property vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; there is no truly pervasive body of international law of property governing investment.87 Not only are investment arbitrators called upon to interpret complex property concepts, they must reach decisions based on divergent conceptions of property in otherwise similar cases. 88 What one can expect of the TPPA is not the disregard of these realities, but a coherent body of investment provisions that balance the public and private attributes of ISA in a coherent and ultimately, fair, manner.
Australia's Objection to Investor-State Arbitration
The prospect of Australia seeking an exemption from investor-state arbitration within a TPP chapter on investment is probable at this time. In a Trade Policy Statement in April 2011,89 the Australian Government enunciated that it "does not support provisions that would confer greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses."90 In particular, it maintained that it will not "support provisions that would constrain the ability of Australian governments to make laws on social, environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those laws do not discriminate between domestic and foreign businesses."91 As a result, it announced that it will "discontinue" the practice of including investor-state dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements. Furthermore, "If Australian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, they will need to make their own assessments about whether they want to commit to investing in those countries."92 How significant this trade policy is in fact is the subject of a more detailed study by the author elsewhere.93 Australia's 2011 Policy statement changes a course which Australia took in the past, since the early 1980's when it began concluding BITs, to include ISA in its treaties, with the notable exception of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement. 94 The Australian Government has since implemented its new Policy in an FTA with Malaysia in May 2012 that does not include investor-state arbitration.
The result is that the Australian Government has sought to be excluded from any ISA provisions under the TPP. It is also expected to provide that investor-state disputes be submitted to domestic courts for resolution, not unlike the dispute resolution provisions in the Australia -US Free Trade Agreement. 95 Under the Australian Policy, national law should govern the rights of foreign investors, particularly foreign investors filing claims against the Australian Government; and the authority of domestic courts should prevail over other options, including resort to diplomatic channels. The jurisdictional rationale for this proposition is that investment disputes ought to be decided by the domestic courts of host states, not international tribunals. 96 The substantive rationale is that foreign investors should receive no better treatment than that which is accorded to local investors. 97 The equitable inference from these rationales is that, were investor-state arbitration to privilege foreign investors, it would not serve the national interest, and if it fails to service the national interest, domestic courts ought to replace it.
Thus far, TPP negotiators appear to have provided Australia with an exemption from ISA provisions in the TPPA, in a state-by-state negotiating process driven by the United States. 98 In support of this position is recognition that country specific exemptions are part and parcel of the negotiations. In further support is the apparent dispelling of a one-size-fits-all TPPA in recognition of local requirements of particular negotiating states on political, economic and social grounds.99 On the other hand, the draft Investment Chapter text illustrates that the parties are not entirely in agreement over this issue. It is in no way settled, and the parties have not agreed, that Australia should be exempt from investor-state dispute settlement obligations, as requested by it.
The choice of domestic litigation over ISA, or the converse, is contingent on the values the proponents of each ascribe to their preference. The proposition that domestic courts are subject to tried and tested domestic rules of evidence and procedure is offset by the fact that ISA arbitration such as under the ICSID is guided by rules of procedure that seek to ensure that arbitration procedures are clear in nature and that an ICSID arbitrator's failure to apply them fairly can lead to annulment for non-compliance. 100 The rationale that domestic courts ought to accord no more than national treatment to foreign investors is countered by the argument that investment arbitrators are equally capable of subscribing to comparable standards of national treatment.101 The supposed insularity of ISA arbitration from domestic law and procedure is also disputable on grounds that ISA arbitrators cannot summarily disregard domestic law if an FTA such as the TPPA treats that domestic law as the applicable law.
Nor are domestic judicial systems invariably reliable in resolving investorstate disputes. The political reality is that, in exercising preferences, countries are also more likely to trust the domestic courts of other countries with which they share common social and economic traditions than those with which they do not.102 Countries are also readier to endorse a "rule of law" culture with which they identify than a culture with which they do not. 103 In addition, countries that uphold the principle of absolute immunity of sovereign states pose unique problems. The most important example is China.104
Unless specific provision is made for by agreement or waiver of immunity, sovereign states cannot be sued in China, nor can arbitral awards made by commercial arbitration institutions be enforced in China. This issue will need to be specifically addressed in the TPPA.
Ultimately, in terms of the general provisions, parties will need to make a choice. An appeal to a domestic court is desirable if the party seeks a final determination on jurisdictional and substantive grounds and considers that country's domestic court reliable. An annulment procedure on narrow jurisdictional grounds under article 52 of the ICSID Convention is preferable if the party considers those grounds suitable. Beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder.
Conclusion
Several of the provisions of TPPA Investment Chapter examined in this paper are likely to change in the final version. It is hoped that some of these changes may be inspired by the analysis undertaken in this paper. At this point, it is also difficult to identify the extent to which the TPPA will serve as an umbrella agreement on investment, mushrooming into a series of BITs that may diverge both inter se and from the TPPA itself. It may be that such mushrooming of BITs may not eventuate, but that the TPPA will address issues systematically such as by imposing uniform performance requirements105 and by regulating non-conforming measures.106 Alternatively, the TPPA may include selective country-specific reservations.
What is reasonable to infer at this time is that the TPPA will provide for investor-state arbitration from which only Australia will seek exemption. It is unclear whether this exemption will be permitted. If granted, it is unclear precisely how the exemption will be framed. It is likely that any conditions to participation or exemption from ISA will be dealt with generally in both the TPPA and country-specific annexes.
Regarding dispute resolution in particular, the choice of TPP Parties is not solely between ISA and litigation. Conflict preventive and avoidance measures sometimes are preferable to both.107 'Multi-tiered' dispute resolution agreements can allow parties to agree upon a tiered process, varying from negotiating in good faith, to mediation, and failing both, to arbitration or litigation, or conceivably, to both.108 It is noteworthy that the UNCTAD considered conflict prevention and avoidance sufficiently important to devote a detailed study to it. 109 Nor, too, is it persuasive to insist that ISA is inherently superior to other methods of dispute resolution, such as domestic litigation. What can be said in defense of ISA under the TPP is that, while it does not lead to judicial precedent as common lawyers conceive of it, reliance on ISA is more stabilizing than reliance on a plethora of different local laws and procedures that domestic courts apply to foreign investment.110 However fragmented different standards of treatment accorded to foreign investors may be under customary international law and however difficult it may be to identify cohesive principles out of ad hoc and sometimes unpublished arbitration awards, a international investment jurisprudence does exist.111
